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STATUTES WHOSE INTERPRETATION IS DETERMINATIVE 
UTAH CODE SECTION 61-1-22(1) (a) and (b) 
Section 61-1-22 (1) (a) and (b) is set forth in its 
entirety on page 9 herein. 
UTAH CODE SECTION 61-1-3(1) 
It is unlawful for any person to transact business 
in this state as a broker-dealer or agent unless he 
is registered under this chapter. 
UTAH CODE SECTION 61-1-13(15)(a) and (5) 
(a) "sale" or "sell" includes every contract for 
sale of, contract to sell, or disposition of, a 
security or interest in a security for value. 
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AV STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The Plaintiff Kent L. Walton brought this action under the 
Utah State Securities Laws (Utah Code Section 61-1-1 et. seq.) 
seeking to recover $15,000 that he invested in Vasilacopulos and 
Associates. Following a jury trial before the Honorable Douglas 
L. Cornaby in the Second Judicial District Court, Davis County 
the jury returned a set of Special Interrogatories finding that 
"the Vasilacopulos and Associates Interest" purchased by Mr. Walton 
was a security, (TR. 418-419) but finding that R. C. Tolman did 
not sell a Vasilacopulos and Associates interest to Kent L. Walton 
for $lf000 on October 7, 1981 or for $14,000 on November 5f 1981 
(TR. 419). Accordingly, judgment was entered for the Defendant. 
Prior to the time that the Court instructed the jury, the 
Plaintiff submitted two proposed jury instructions dealing with the 
meaning of the word "sell". Those instructions were denied. Those 
i ' • • ' • ' 
instructions stated: ; 
"You are instructed that under Utah State Securities 
Law that "sell" is defined to include contracts for sale 
of, contract to sell or disposition of a security or 
interest in a security for value." 
Source: ! 
1. Utah Code Annotated 61-1-13(15) (a) 
The Court then instructed the jury, over the Plaintiff's 
objection (TR. 414 and 415) that: 
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"You are instructed that in order to find R. C. 
Tolman "sold" any security to Walton you must find that 
his conduct was the proximate cause of any sale, that is, 
his conduct and participation was a substantial factor 
in bringing about any actual purchase and sell transaction, 
(see Jury Instruction No. 18) (Emphasis Added) 
The proximate cause of an event is that cause which, 
in natural and continuous sequence, produces the event. 
It is the efficient cause-—the one that necessarily sets 
; in operation the factors that acconplish the event. (see 
Jury Instruction No. 19) (Emphasis Added) 
You are instructed that R. C. Tolman cannot be held 
legally responsible fpr Walton's losses from his purchases 
of the investments in question if Tolman merely partici-
pated in the purchase and sale transactions as an agent of 
Vasilacopulos without actually "selling" the investments 
to Walton as that term has been defined for you in these 
instructions. (see Jury Instructions No. 22) (Emphasis 
Added). 
B. THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR IN FAILING TO INSTRUCT 
THE JURY AS TO THE MEANING OF "SELL" PURSUANT TO UTAH CODE ANN. 
§ 61-1-13(15) ; ^  .;,/ 
1. MATTERS ADMITTED BY DEFENDANT AT TRIAL. 
In order for the Court to evaluate the Plaintiff's arguments 
it is necessary for the Court to understand additional facts. 
During the course of the trial Mr. Tolman testified as to his 
involvement with Vasilacopulos and Associates and with the Plaintiff, 
Kent L. Walton. The following facts are drawn exclusively from the 
testimony of R. C. Tolman unless it is otherwise indicated. 
During 1981, R. C. Tolman served as a Salesman for Vasilacopulos 
and Associates (TR. 3). In that capacity Tolman received a commis-
sion of 10% of the Vasilacopulos and Associates interests that he 
sold. (TR. 4), Investors were told that under the Vasilacopulos 
and Associates plan, an individual would invest money in Vasila-
copulos and Associates. That money would be taken by Mr. Jon 
Vasilacopulos, tfho would purchase large quantities of diamonds at 
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wholesale prices (TR. 21). Thereafter those diamonds would be 
resold and the profit paid to the Investors (TR 22) after about 
four weeks time (TR. 10). The return on that investment was re-
ported to be approximately 30% per month (TR. 9). If the investors 
desired, they could hold diamonds as collateral or security for 
their investment (TR. 10f 19f 327). Very few of the investors 
actually took the diamonds (TR. 89). 
On August 14, 1981, Tolman opened an office of Vasilacopulos 
& Associates in Centerville, Utah (TR. 3). That office was located 
in the office of R. C. Tolman Construction, Inc. (TR. 4) and Mr. 
Tolman was the manager of that office (TR. 4 and 6) and a full time 
employee for Vasilacopulos (TR. 78,79). Tolman was the only 
salesman for Vasilacopulos & Associates located at the Centerville 
Office (TR. 6). In August 1981, Mr. Tolman hired Lana Townsend as 
a secretary. Ms. Townsend was paid by checks drawn on the account 
of R. C. Tolman Construction, Inc. (TR. 80, 133) but worked 
solely for Vasilacopulos & Associates (TR. 81) 
From August 14, 1981 until Novemeber 6, 1981 approximately 
1100 people (TR. 78) invested 2 million dollars in Vasilacopulos & 
Associates through the office of R. C. Tolman Construction (TR. 386). 
Each week the Centerville office received between $100,000 and 300,000 
from investors (TR. 91). Mr. Tolman received or was entitled to 
receive a 10% sales commission on the entire sum, (TR. 138) and 
all that money came through Tolman (TR. 76). During that period 
of time Mr. Tolman controlled the Centerville office's books 
(TR. 127) and bank accounts (TR. 62). 
From August 1981 through October 1981, Jon Vasilacopulos made 
withdrawals from the Centerville account (TR. 63). Prior to October 
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6, 1981, M4. Vasilacopulos had withdrawn 1.5 million dollars from 
the Centerville office bank account without returning any funds to 
the Centerville office (TR. 384). Tolman knew that fact when he first 
met with Walton but did not i'nform him of that fact (TR. 385) . Prior 
to November 5, 1981, Vasilacopulos had withdrawn approximately 
$1,854,000.00 from the Centerville office bank accounts (TR. 386). 
Mr. Tolman knew this fact (TR. 391) since he had established a 
system to monitor Mr. Vasilacopulos1 withdrawals from the Centerville 
bank accounts (TR. 63 and TR. 391). 
Vasilacopulos never returned a single penny to the Centerville 
account (TR. 63, 75) despite the fact that the Vasilacopulos plan 
called for diamonds to be bought and sold every four weeks (TR. 389). 
The fact that Vasilacopulos never returned any profits concerned 
Tolman (TR. 389) but despite the fact that the Centerville office's 
bank account had become depleted by Vasilacopulos1 withdrawals 
(TR. 390) Mr. Tolman did not tell those who invested after the 
end of October 1981, that the bank account of the Centerville 
office of Vasilacopulos & Associates was empty (TR. 390). 
Tolman first met with the Plaintiff, Kent L. Walton on 
October 6, 1981. At that meeting Tolman explained the "Vasilacopulos 
plan" to Walton. (TR. 65, 77). Tolman told Walton that the venture 
"should be looked upon as high risk" (TR. 65, 66). This was the 
same thing that Tolman told all investors (TR. 77) (See also 
testimony of Kent L. Walton) (TR. 203-206). According to Mr. Walton, 
Tolman told him that he would receive 30% per month (TR. 204) 
(Compare with Tolman testimony at TR 9). Tolman also informed Walton 
that an investor could "hold diamonds" to cover his investment. 
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(TR. 205). Thereafter, on October 7, 1981, Walton delivered a 
cashiers check to Tolman in the sum of $1,000 (Tolman, TR. 72-77) 
and Tolman delivered a receipt to Walton, personally signed and 
prepared by Tolman, for that $1,000 (TR. 77, 78 and Plaintiff's 
Exhibit No. 2). Thereafter, on November 5, 1981, Walton delivered 
a check in the sum of $14,000 to Centerville office (TR. 83, 84) 
During the period of time between late September 1981, and 
the end of October 1981, Vasilacopulos & Associates collapsed 
(see generally TR. 34-55). In late September 1981, Tolman attempted 
to purchase "collateral" diamonds from United Investment Reserve 
in California (TR 34). (These diamonds were to be held by the 
investors to protect their investment (TR. 28-30)). The "collateral" 
diamonds were different than the diamonds that were allegedly pur-
chased and sold by Vasilacopulos to generate a profit (TR. 23). 
United Investment however, refused to ship Tolman any diamonds 
even though Tolman had wired United Investment $300,000 for those 
diamonds since Vasilacopulos & Associates stilled owed United 
Investment at least $300,000 from a previous purchase. (TR. 34-37) 
Mr. Tolman was aware of that fact (TR. 37) . 
On October 23, 1981, Tolman paid out the last of the funds in 
the Centerville account (TR. 132-134). On October 24, 1981, the 
Deseret News published an article alleging that the price of dia-
monds had dropped drastically and that it was impossible for people 
to make 30% per month on a commodity that had been dropping for a 
year. (See TR. 30, 43 and Plaintifffs Exhibit No. 6) The article 
also implied that the diamond investment plan was a "ponzi scheme" 
(See Plaintiff's Exhibit No. 9). In connection with the last 
-5-
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allegation it is interesting to note the manner in which Tolman 
ran the Centerville bank account. (TR. 91). Tolman read that 
article (TR. 58). Following the publication of the article many of 
Vasilacopulos1 investors requested the return of their money. 
Because the funds had been depleted a high number of investorsf 
perhaps as many as 150 investors, did not receive any return of 
their investment. (TR. 51) At that time investors were coming 
into the Centerville office every day asking for the return of their 
money (TR. 53), none of the investors were paid their money in 
November of 1981 (TR. 51). Thereafter, on November 2, 1981f Tolman 
refused to allow any new investors to invest in Vasilacopulos & 
Associates (TR. 64) because the office was out of diamonds and 
funds (TR. 65). Prior to that time Tolman had been "hounding" 
Vasilacopulos to get him additional funds and diamonds (TR. 65). 
Thereafter, on November 5, 1981, Kent Walton delivered a check in 
the sum of $14,000 to the Centerville office (TR. 83, 84 and 
Plaintiff's Exhibit No. 4). That deposit was made late in the 
afternoon of November 5, 1981 (Walton, TR. 209). In the first week 
of November 1981, Tolman received $38,200. (TR. 401). All of that 
money came from previous investors (TR. 4 02). At least some of that 
money went to pay R. C. Tolman the commissions for the Vasilacopulos 
sales (TR. 93, 94). The November commission may have been in 
excess of $30,000 (TR. 94). In all Tolman, his wife and company were 
paid the sum of $201,847.00 by Vasilacopulos & Associates (TR. 409). 
That sum represents $63,419.00 above any investment made by Tolman 
in Vasilacopulos & Associates (TR. 413) or an annual commission in 
excess of $243,000.00. 
During the last few weeks in October 1981, Tolman became very 
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concerned about the financial condition of Vasilacopulos & Associ-
ates. On October 28, 1981, Tolman wrote to Vasilacopulos as 
follows: 
Dear Jon, 
Enclosed find the article by Deseret News dated 
October 24, 1981. The article is having a bad effect 
on the Centerville bank account; it is overdrawn at 
the present. The $250,000 you withdrew from the account 
on October 8, 1981 and the $200,000 you withdrew on 
October 15, 1981 has left this office without funds 
to operate on. I have kept very good records of what 
is owed your diamond purchasers, but the effect of the 
said article is causing may of the diamond purchasers 
to want their money back. : 
I am requesting money from you on the diamond sales 
as our funds are depleted. Money is needed to pay the 
returns to the many people who are demanding their cash 
returned at this time. I have not received any monies to 
pay what is needed. I am having to make excuses to the 
people which is causing me personal discomfort. I am 
puzzled as to what the delay would be. If there is a 
problem with funding or selling the diamonds I need to 
know. Otherwise, I have nothing to tell them and they are 
suspecting the worst. 
I am only a commissioned salesman for your organ-
ization and I am on the firing line with the diamond 
purchasers. Please let me know immediately if what they 
suspect is true. 
Sincerely, 
R. C. Tolman 
See P l a i n t i f f ' s E x h i b i t No. 7 . The n e x t day (OiUobtvt; 2 l), ! (>0 1 ) , 
Tolman wrote to Vasilacopulos as follows: 
Dear Jon, 
I have worked for your organization since January 
1981. We have been very successful in obtaining a large 
number of diamond buyers. My arrangement with you was to 
receive 10% commission on all new accounts. I have kept 
a good account of all the prople and their deposits. I 
have not been able to keep current on my earned commiss-
ions because of lack of funds. I have approximately 
$70,000 commissions due me. I was able to deduct small 
amounts of my commission from the Vasilacopulos and 
Assoc. account from time to time, but because of the 
present drain on funds I am concerned about being paid 
all I am owedT It is important to me to be more current 
and up-to-date with the commissions. I have requested 
more current funds, but none are forthcoming. I cannot 
-7-
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get in touch with you by phone, so I have written this 
letter. Please help me out! 
Sincerely, 
R. C. Tolman. 
See Plaintiff's Exhibit No. 7. 
Concerning the last week of October 1981, and the first week 
of November 1981, Mr. Tolman Testified: 
Q. So actually the money ran out on October 23rd, 
didn't it? 
A. Well, These — 
Q. Not money that came in subsequent. But the money * 
that was in the account prior to that was gone on October 
23rd, wasn't it? 
A. No, it wasn't all gone. There was deposits that 
were put into the account after that date. 
Q. There were new deposits? 
A. Yes. 
Q. But the money that had been in the account was 
depleted, taken to pay off the investors on October 23rd, 
wasn't it? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Now, you said you just bit the bullet after this 
and informed people that the funds were not available. 
Did you tell them the money was gone; the bank account was 
empty? 
A. That is what it means when you don't have any funds. 
Q. And the people you told this to were the people 
that wanted their money? 
A. Yes. 
Q. How about the people that were going to pay in 
money; did you tell them as well? 
A. The people that I paid money? 
Q. That are paying in the money to Vasilacopulos & 
Associates; did you say the bank account is empty? 
A. No. 
Q. Or as of October 23rd, 1981, we paid the last of the 
money out we had at that time? 
A. No, I didn't tell them. (TR. 133, 134) 
At trial the Defendant stipulated that neither he nor his 
company registered as an agent or in any other capacity with the 
Utah Satate Securities Commission. (TR. 73). At trial the Defen-
dant did not offer any proof that the Vasilacopulos & Associates 
security was exempt from registration. Indeed, Tolman testified 
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that he did not know whether or not the Vasilacopulos interest was 
exempt from registration (TR. 73). 
2. UTAH STATUTORY LAW 
Section 61-1-22(1) and (2) of the Utah Code states: 
(1) Any person who: 
(a) Offers or sells a security in violation of sub-
section 61-1-3 (1)f section 61-1-7 or subsction 61-1-17(2) 
or of any rule or order under section 61-1-15 which requires 
the affirmative approval of sales literature before it is 
usedf or of any condition imposed under subsection 61-1-10(4) 
or 61-1-11(7); or 
(b) Offersf sells, or purchases a security by means 
of any untrue statement of a material fact or any omis-
sion to state a material fact necessary in order to make 
the statements madef in the light of the circumstances 
under which they are made, not misleading, the buyer not 
knowing of the untruth or ommission, and who does not sus-
tain the burden of proof that he did not know, and in the 
exercise of reasonable care could not have known, of the 
untruth or ommision, is liable to the person selling the 
security to or buying the security from him, who may sue 
either at law or in equity to recover the consideration 
paid for the security, together with interest at 12% per 
year from the date of payment, costs, and reasonable 
attorney's fees, less the amount of any income received 
on the security, upon the tender of the security or for 
damages if he no longer owns the security. Damages are 
the amount that would be recoverable upon the tender less 
the value of the security when the buyer disposed of it and 
interest at 12% per year from the date of disposition. 
(2) Every person who directly or indirectly controls 
a seller or buyer liable under subsection (1), every partner, 
officer, or director of such a seller or buyer, every 
person occupying a similar status or performing similar 
functions, every employee of such a seller or buyer who 
materially aids in the sale or purchase, and every broker-
dealer or agent who materially aids in the sale are also 
liable jointly and severally with and to the same extent 
as the seller or purchaser, unless the nonseller or non-
purchaser who is so liable sustains the burden of proof 
that he did not know, and in exercise of reasonalbe care 
could not have known, of the existence of the facts by rea-
son of which the liability is alleged to exist. There is 
contribution as in cases of contract among the several 
persons so liable. (Emphasis Added) 
-9-
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Section 63-1-3(1) states: 
It is unlawful for any person to transact business 
in this state as a broker-dealer or agent unless he is 
registered under this chapter. i 
An "agent" is defined in Section 61-1-13(2) of the Utah Code as: 
Any individual other than a broker-dealer who 
represents a broker-dealer or issuer in effecting or 
attempting to effect purchases or sales of securities. i 
"Agent" does not include an individual who represents 
an issuer, who receives no commission or other remunera-
tion, directly or indirectly, for effecting or attempting 
to effect purchases or sales of securities, and who: (a) 
effects transactions in securities exempted by clause (a), 
(b), (c), (i) or (j) of subsection 61-1-14(1); (b) effects < 
transactions exempted by subsection 61-1-14(2); or (c) 
effects transactions with existing partners, officers, or 
directors of the issuer. 
An issuer is defined in Section 61-1-13(11) as: 
Any person who issues or proposes to issue any 
security, or has outstanding security that it has 
issued. 
Black's Law Dictionary defines issue as "to put into circulation; 
as, the treasury issues notes." 
Section 61-1-13(15) defines the meaning of the words "sale", 
"sell", "offer" and "offer to sell" and gives examples of those 
terms. Those terms are defined as: 
"Sale" or "sell" includes every contract for sale 
of, contract to sell, or disposition of, a security or 
interest in a security for value. 
"Offer" or "offer to sell" includes every attempt 
or offer to dispose, or solicitation of an offer to buy, 
a security or interest in a security for value. (Emphasis 
Added) 
C. DEFENDANT TOLMAN SOLD THE PLAINTIFF A SECURITY 
Summary Both cases decided under Section 410(a) of the Uniform 
Securities Act and under Section 12(2) of the Federal Security Act 
of 1933 would hold that the Defendant R. C. Tolman "sold" the 
Plaintiff a security. 
-10-
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The issue in this action is simply whether the trial court 
committed reversible error in not advising that the sale of a 
security included any "disposition of a security or interest in a 
security of value" pursuant to the definition set forth herein, 
did Tolman "sell" the Vasilacopulos interest to Walton? 
It should be noted that once the Court makes that determina-
tion, then judgment should be entered for the Plaintiff and the 
matter remanded for a determination of Plaintiff's attorney's fees 
pursuant to Section 61-1-22 (1) (a). There is no question that the 
Vasilacopulos interest constituted a security (TR. 418) and that 
Tolman did not register as an agent with the Utah State Securities 
(TR, 73 and Jury Instruction No. 20) . 
The leading case interpreting Section 61-1-22 is S & F 
Supply Company v, Hunter 527 P.2d 217 (Utah, 1974) That case 
however, does not address the issues raised in this action. In 
interpreting Section 61-1-22, however, the Utah Supreme Court 
noted that Section 61-1-22 "is sufficiently identical with Section 
410(a)(2) of the Uniform Securities Act (U.L.A.), and Section 12(2) 
of the Federal Securities Act of 1933 that we regard adjudications 
on those statutes as helpful to us. S & F Supply, Supra, 220 
footnote 3. 
1. CASES DECIDED UNDER SECTION 410(a) OF THE UNIFORM SECURITIES 
ACT, (U.L.A.) 
Summary: numerous cases decided under Section 410(a) of the Uniform 
Securities Act have held an agent liable for the "sell" of securities. 
-11-
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Numerous cases have been adjudicated in other states under 
Section 410 of the Uniform Securities Act (U.L.A.) concerning the 
meaning of the term "sell". The applicable statutes in these 
actions define "sell11 in the same manner as does Utah under 
Section 61-1-13(15). 
In McClellan v. Sundholm 574 P.2d 371 (Wash. 1978) the 
Supreme Court of Washington held that a salesman who described 
the Defendant company's services including selection of silver, 
storage of bars, advice regarding silver market and resale of 
silver for purchaser at commission and who advised Plaintiff as to 
how payment was to be made, had "offered to sell" and had "sold" 
unregistered security to the Plaintiff pursuant to the Washington 
State Statute, RCW 21.20.430(1) that made the sale of an unregistered 
security illegal. 
In McClellan the Washington Supreme Court, indiscussing the 
role of the salesman stated: 
Since there is no question that the security 
was unregistered, the only remaining issue is which 
statutory section defines the liability of the respondent. 
The trial court found RCW 21.20.430(3) applicable. That 
section defines the civil liability of "every person who 
directly or indirectly controls a seller or buyer liable 
under subsection (1) or (2) . . .." Subsection (1), on 
the other hand, defines the liability of "any person, who 
offers or sells a security in violation of any provisions 
of RCW 21.20.140 . . . " The trial court apparently believed 
Sundholm did not offer or sell a security, but only dir-
ectly or indirectly controlled a seller. We disagree. 
It is quite clear that Sundholm did offer to sell, 
and did in fact sell, the security to appellant under the 
the definitions of "offer17" and "sell" in RCW 21.20.005(10) . 
An "offer" is an "attempt or offer to dispose of, or solici-
tation of an offer to buy" a security. This accurately de-
cribes respondent's sales approach to appellant. The term 
"sell" includes "every contract of sale of, contract to 
sell, or disposition of, a security . ." We find the pur-
-12-
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
chase agreement here was a disposition, and therefore 
a sale, of a security, 
"""" Respondentf s liability is therefore defined by 
RCW 21.20.430(1) applicable to any person "who offers 
or sells a security." (Emphasis Added) (Supra at 374) 
In Cola v. Terzano 322 A.2d 195 (N. J. Super. 1974) the pur-
chaser of unregistered corporate stock an action against the 
salesman who sold her that stock. That salesman was a manager in 
one of the offices of the corporation whose stock was sold. The 
salesman in that action explained the investment to the Plaintiff, 
received a check from her which he forwarded to the corporation 
and received a commission from that purchase. In discussing the 
salesman's (Terzano) liability for the sale of the unregistered 
stock pursuant to a statute that is virtually identical to Utah 
Code Section 61-1-22(1) the New Jersey Superior Court stated: 
There can be no doubt as to Terzanofs liability 
under N. J. S. A. 49-3-70 (a). He was the actual seller 
who negotiated with Mrs. Cola, made the representations 
in question, and participated in the actual transfer of 
funds from Mrs. Cola to I. I. S. (Supra at 200) (Emphasis 
Added) 
In Gaudina v. Haberman 644 P.2d 159 (Wyo. 1982) the Wyoming 
Supreme Court found an unregistered salesman liable for the sale 
of unregistered securities under the Wyoming Statutory equivalent 
of Section 410(a)(1) of the Uniform Securities Act (U.L.A) 
In Gaudina the salesman sold the Plaintiffs a "trust contract" 
through Heritage Trust Company. Those contracts were subsequently 
determined to be securities by both the S.E.C. and the Wyoming 
Supreme Court. See Gaudina at 16 4. 
In holding the salesman (Gaudina) liable for violating the 
applicable Wyoming statutes (Those statutes are identical to Utah 
Code Sections 61-1-22 (a) (1), 61-1-3(1) or 61-1-13(2)), the Wyoming 
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Supreme Court stated: 
(10) Gaudina was a person unlawfully acting as 
an agent in the sale of uriexempt securities and had 
not registered as suc~an agent as required by § 17-
117.3, W.S. 1957, C.1965, now §17-4-103, W.S.1977, 
supra fn.7. This automatically made him civilly 
liable under §TT-117Y22(a)(1), W.S.1957, C.1965, 
now §17-4-122 (a) (i) , W.SYl:977yfn;/"^ The various 
unlawful acts creating civil liability are in the 
alternative, as underscored. Gaudina was a person 
who sold nonexempt, unregistered securities in viola-
tion of §17-117.7f W.S.1957, C.1965, now §17-4-107f 
W.S.1977. This also automatically created civil 
liability under §17-117.22 (a) (1)f W.S.1957, C.1965, 
now §17-4-122 (a) (i) , *W.S.1977. 
In Cola v. Terzano, 129 N.J.Super. 47,322 A.2d 
195 (1974) it was held that the state's Uniform 
Securities Law was intended to protect the uninitiated 
and to prevent fraud on the public. All who participated 
in the sale of an unregistered security, including 
the salesman, have a civil liability. An agent is 
is charged with knowledge of the registration require-
ments and liable for his assistance in the distribu-
tion of unregistered securities. The court held that 
it is clear that liability attaches "by operation of 
law" to the sale by any person of any nonexempt, 
unregistered security and gives rise to a cause of 
action against all those who participated in the sale. 
The only facts necessary are that a security 
was sold, that it was unregistered, and that it was 
not exempt. Here the security was not only unregistered 
but it was also sold by an unregistered agent, which also 
creates civil liability without more. (Supra at 168) 
(Emphasis added). 
2. DECISIONS UNDER SECTION 12(2) OF THE SECURITIES ACT OF 1933. 
Summary: Federal decisions under Rule 12(2) of the Federal Securi-
ties Act of 1933 support an "expansive" definition of the word 
"sell" so as to include the Defendant as a "seller" in the present 
action. j ! 
;
 • • i' = • i •• i • • • . 
In summarizing the meaning of the word "sell" under Section 
12(2) of Federal Securities Act of 1933 it has been stated: 
Liability for violations of either prohibition of 
section 12 of the Securities Act attaches to one who 
"offers or sells" a security—the action being brought 
by the "person purchasing . . . from him." At its 
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most basic level, this language depicts a buyer/seller 
relationship not at all unlike traditional contractual 
privity. However, section 2(3) of the Act defines 
"sale" or "sell" to include "every contract of sale 
or disposition of a security or interest in a security, 
for value" and the terms "offer to sell," "offer for sale," 
or "offer" to include "every attempt or offer to dispose of, 
or solicitation of an offer to buy, a security or interest 
in a security, for value." Careful consideration of 
this provision reveals that any person can make an 
"attempt to dispose" of a secuirty. Thus, in the case 
of a passive actual seller who sells through an active 
agent, the latter can also logically be deemed a "person 
who sells" within the contemplation oT section 12. 
(Emphasis Added). 
Rapp, Expanded Liability under Section 12 of the Securities Act; 
When is a Seller not a Seller? 27 Case Western Reserve Law Review 
445, 450 (1977. See also Loss, Fundamentals of Securities Regu-
lation, 1712. 
The foregoing reasoning was adopted in 1940 in Cady v. Murphy 
113 F.2d 988 (1st Cir. 1940), cert denied 311 U.S. 705 (1940). In 
Cady v. Murphy the court dealt with the issue of the liability of 
Security broker under Section 12(2). At trial the broker argued 
that the section 12 recission remedy only contemplated a restora-
tion of the status quo between those in strict contractual privity. 
The trial court rejected that argument stating: 
Whether the seller, being a broker, himself owns the 
security, or whether he is acting as the agent for the 
owner, or for the pruchaser, or for both, is immaterial. 
If, in the course of an attempt to dispose of, or solici-
tation of an offer to buy a security, he makes false 
statements under circumstances referred to in Section 12, 
the purchaser is given a right of action to recover any 
damages he has suffered on account of the false represen-
tations. 
Cady v. Murphy 30 F. Supp. 466, 469 (D.Me.1939) The First 
Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed this analysis stating: "This is 
not a strained interpretation of the statute, for a selling agent 
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in common parlance would describe himself as a person who sells, 
though title passes from his principal, not from him. (Id at 990) 
In discussing agent liability under Section 12(2) it was re-
cently stated in Sommerville v. Major Exploration 576 F.Supp 902 
(D.S.D.N.Y. 1983) that: 
Nevertheless, although strict privity is not a 
prerequisite to liability, Plaintiff must establish 
clearly that Defendant is at least a person acting as 
the immediate seller's agent, one who is alleged to be 
a controlling person of the immediate seller; one who 
actively participated in the sale, either as an aider 
and abetter or as a co-conspirator, or one under simi-
lar circumstances. (Supra at 913) (Emphasis Added). 
See also Junker v. Crory 650 F.2d 1349 (5th Cir. 1981) 
In Klein v. Computer Devices 591 F. Supp 270, 274 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) 
it was stated: 
This section [12(2)], as compared with common 
law recission, provides several advantages to the 
buyer. For example section 12(2) permits the buyer 
to pierce the privity requirement that normally 
prevails in common law recission to the extent of reaching 
controlling persons, "sellers" who are agents rather 
than principals, and others who participate in the 
sale more or less in the criminal aidor and abettor 
sense. (Emphasis added) 
In Lawler v. Gilliam 569 F.2d 1283 (4th Cir 1978) the Fourth 
Circuit Court of Appeals discussed the meaning of the word "sell" in 
a factual setting similar to the present action: That action in-
volved an action to recover the amounts paid to purchase unregistered 
securities. In discussing the meaning of the word "sell" under 
Section 2(3) of the Federal Security Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77(b)(3) 
the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals stated: 
Section 12(1) imposes liability on any person 
who "offers or sells" securities in violation of the reg-
istration provisions of the Act. These terms are defined 
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in §2(3) of the Act, 15 U.S.C. § 77b(3): 
The term . . . "sell" shall include every 
contract of sale or disposition of a sec-
urity, for value. The term . . . "offer" 
shall include every attempt or offer to 
dispose of, or solicitation of an offer to 
buy, a security for value. 
These definitions include as sellers or offerors all 
persons whose actions are a substantial factor in causing 
a purchaser to buy a security. It is unnecessary 
to show that the offeror or seller owns the security, 
for the definitions encompasses any significant 
participation in the sale on behalf of the actual owner. 
Liability may be imposed on any person who actively 
solicits an order, participates in the negotiations, 
or arranges the sale. (Supra at 12 8 7 and 128 8) (Cita-
tions omitted and Emphasis Added) 
The Defendant argues that he did not "sell" the Vasilacopulos 
Interest to the Plaintiff. He argues that Walton "sold" himself 
on the investment. That Walton went to Tolman's office with his 
"mind made up" (TR. 275). In other words the Defendant is arguing 
that he is not liable to the Plaintiff because he did not 'persuade" 
the Plaintiff to purchase the security (TR. 275). Because the 
Plaintiff had his "mind made up" to purchase the Vasilacopulos 
security the Defendant argues that he did not "proximately cause" 
the sale. Defendant ignores the fact that he explained the 
Vasilacopulos plan to the Plaintiff (TR. 77,78); that he personally 
received and receipted the Plaintiff's money, that he received a 
10% commission on all Vasilacopulos sales (TR. 4), that the company 
that bore his name permitted Vasilacopulos to use his office (TR. 3); 
that the Defendant told the Plaintiff he would receive a 30% per 
month return on his investment (TR. 204, TR. 9); that he personally 
opened the office at which Walton invested (TR. 3). That he was 
the only salesman in the Centerville office (TR. 6). That he hired 
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(TR. 183) and paid (TR. 80, 183) the secretary who receipted 
the Plaintiff's second check. If Tolman didn't sell the Vasila-
copulos security to Walton, who did? 
D. PUBLIC POLICY CONSIDERATIONS 
In recent years the State of Utah has received much negative 
publicity for the manner in which the Utah Security industry 
operates. 
The Utah Securities Laws 61-1-1 et. seq. were enacted for the 
remedial purpose of restoring investor confidence in the financial 
markets. See generally: Bennettf Securities Regulation in Utah: 
A Recap of History and the New Uniform Actf 8 Utah L. Rev. 216 (1963) . 
In light of those purposes the Utah Supreme Court recently declared 
that "Securities Laws are remedial in nature and should be broadly 
and liberally construed to give effect to their purpose. Payable 
Accounting Corp. v. McKinley 667 P.2d 15 (Utahf 1983). Similarly, 
the Utah Supreme Court in S & F Supply Company v. Hunter 527 P.2d 
217 (Utah 1974) in discussing the purpose of Section 61-1-22 (1) (b) . 
The Utah Supreme Court emphasized the remedial nature of that section. 
In this action the jury ruled that the Vasilacopulos Interest 
constituted a security. The Defendant stipulated that he did not 
register as an agent or in any capacity with the Utah State Securities 
Commission. Section 61-1-22(1)(a) and (b) states: 
Any person who offers or sells a security in vio-
lation of subsection 61-1-3(1) [making it illegal for 
one to transact business as an agent unless he has 
registered with the Utah State Securities Commission] 
. . . is liable to the person buying a security from 
him . . . 
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Obviously an unregistered agent can be held liable for selling 
a security that does not belong to him. Otherwise why would the 
legislature, by reference, refer to agents in that subsection if 
the Defendant's definition of "sell" is adopted an unregistered 
agent could sit in his Utah office constantly selling securities 
just So long as he didn't sell to anyone who wasn't already "sold11 
on the particular security. Clearly such a result is ridiculous. 
The purpose of requiring the registration of agents is to protect 
the public. Such a purpose requires a general registration. 
Clearly the statutes purpose can only be accomplished if the 
definitions of the word "sell" and "offer to sell" are broad. 
Hence, the definitions set forth in Section 61-1-13 (15) (a). 
CONCLUSION 
The Plaintiff contends the failure of the trial court to 
instruct the jury as to meaning of the word "sell" pursuant to 
Utah Code Section 61-1-13(15) constitutes reversible error. 
From the authorities presented and from the facts that Mr. 
Tolman admitted at trial, it is clear that the Defendant sold the 
Plaintiff the Vasilacopulos interest within the meaning of that 
section. The definition established by Statute would therefore 
have been significant benefit to the jury in determining that a 
"saleM had occurred. The failure of the trial court to give the 
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definition adopted by the legislature therefore constituted re-
versible error. 
Dated this 26th day of December, 1985. 
RESPECTFUL 
KIRK £. LUSTO 
Attorney for Plaintiff/Appellant 
and Cross-Respondent 
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ADDENDUM 
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INSTRUCTION NO. 
You are instructed that under Utah State Securities Law 
that "sell" is defined to include contracts for sale of, contract 
to sell or disposition of a securtiy or interest in a security for 
value 
Source: 
1. Utah Code Annotated 61-1-13 (15). (a) 
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; .INSTRUCTION NO. * Q 
You are instructed that in order to find R.C. Tolman l!soldlf 
any security to Walton you must find that his conduct was the 
proximate cause of any sale, that is, his conduct and 
participation was a substantial factor in bringing about JJkw* 
actual Uyy-^ sa^ Lb transaction/*. 
fmcka^ (kAci ^t[[ 
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INSTRUCTION NO. H 
The proximate cause of an event is that cause which, in 
natural and continuous sequence, produces the event. It is the 
efficient cause—the one that necessarily sets in operation the 
factors that accomplish the event. 
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INSTRUCTION NO- C2«X 
You are instructed that R.C. Tolman cannot be held legally 
responsible for Walton's losses from his purchases of the 
investments in question if Tolman merely participated in the 
purchase and sale transactions as an agent of Vasilacopolus and 
Associates without actually ,fsellingff the investments to Walton as 
that term has been defined for you in these instructions. 
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